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Techniques in Attacking and Defending XML/Web Services

Mamoon Yunus and Jason Macy gave this presentation with an overview of XML/Web services and how the usual security rules apply to this area.

Review of the problems with XML/Web services

Still have all the normal problems.

  • Firewalls are not aware of the xml content
  • Malware and viruses (or xss) can be included in the content depending on what context the xml data is used.
  • WSDL exposes the schema and message structure
  • Injection attacks are possible via the XML parameters
  • Data replay is still possible
  • Denial of service is still possible, especially with parameters

The OWASP Top 10 Vulnerabilities for 2010 (release candidate 1)

The OWASP Top 10 is a set of classes of vulnerabilities that are very high risk. They are provided as a tool that application developers can use to judge whether their application meets best practices based on whether or not it has facilities to deal with these top 10 items.

The Internet's 10 most dangerous people you don't know

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Robert Hansen (who actually wore a suit, which was quite surprising to me) gave out a list of 10 people he thought were the most dangerous people for the internet that you don't actually know. These are people responsible for infrastructure or services that are important to the safety and ongoing functionality and yet are not generally recognized as important/dangerous people.

10. Network engineer at C|Net

Scalable application assessments in the enterprise

Tom Parker & Lars Ewe of Cenzic discussed automated and manual testing and how to scale those practices to large enterprises.

One big question they posed was "How often are you scanning your applications?" And the basic point is, we don't run virus scanners one time we run them regularly and the same should apply to application scanners.

They contend that there are two major schools about scanning

  • Automated testing is the only practical and financially scalable solution.
  • Manual testing is the only valid solution.

Application security beyond the scanner monkey

Matt Fisher of Piscis Security gave a discussion about security beyond the "scanner monkey" phase. Scanner monkeys being people who run a scanner tool, get the output, and think they are done with a vulnerability assessment. There are more and more scanners - commercial, proprietary, and open source - and yet they are no longer good enough.

  • The scanners only start the process, they don't end it.
  • The person running the scanner is likely not talented enough to configure it properly.
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